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Abstract—This letter focuses on the physical layer security over
two-user multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) non-orthogonal
multiple access (NOMA) networks. A linear precoding technique
is designed to ensure the confidentiality of the message of each
user from its counterpart. This technique first splits the base
station power between the two users and, based on that, decom-
poses the secure MIMO-NOMA channel into two MIMO wiretap
channels, and designs the transmit covariance matrix for each
channel separately. The proposed method substantially enlarges
the secrecy rate compared to existing linear precoding methods
and strikes a balance between performance and computation
cost. Simulation results verify the effectiveness of the proposed
method.
Index Terms—MIMO-NOMA, physical layer security, wiretap,
precoding, GSVD.
I. INTRODUCTION
In view of its potential to increase connectivity, reduce
latency, and improve spectral efficiency, non-orthogonal mul-
tiple access (NOMA) has attracted tremendous attention for
fifth generation and beyond wireless networks [1]. In NOMA,
the base station broadcasts the same signal to serve multiple
users over the same resources in time/frequency/code/space.
Due to the broadcast nature of transmission, NOMA users are
susceptible to internal and external eavesdroppers. Therefore,
new aspects of physical layer security need to be analyzed in
NOMA networks.
To fulfill the security requirements of single-antenna NOMA
networks, existing security techniques such as cooperated
relaying and jamming have been proposed [2]–[5]. In multiple-
input, multiple-output (MIMO) NOMA networks, other meth-
ods such as artificial noise (AN)-aided transmission and beam-
forming [6]–[8] have been proposed to make communications
less vulnerable to ‘external’ eavesdroppers. These solutions are
mostly to secure data transmission from external eavesdrop-
pers. However, since a superimposed signal is transmitted to
a group of legitimate users, an important question is whether
NOMA users can communicate their messages confidentially,
or legitimate ‘internal’ users may compromise their security?
Early works have proved that, in a two-user MIMO-NOMA
network, both users can transmit their messages concurrently
and confidentially via secret dirty-paper coding (S-DPC) [9].1
The complexity of S-DPC is, however, not acceptable in prac-
tice. This motivates the development of low-complexity, fast
solutions, such as designing linear precoding. In [11], a linear
precoder based on generalized singular value decomposition
(GSVD) is designed using orthogonal parallel channel trans-
mission. However, this solution is far from the capacity region.
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1There are other important information-theoretic models related to MIMO-
NOMA security with external eavesdroppers [10].
Fig. 1: Illustration of a two-user secure MIMO-NOMA network in
which each user should be able to decode only its message.
In [12], the secrecy capacity of two-user MIMO-NOMA is
transformed into a weighted secrecy sum-rate maximization
problem. This method improves the achievable secrecy rates
but still is time-consuming.
In this letter, we design precoding and power allocation ma-
trices to achieve the secrecy capacity region of two-user Gaus-
sian MIMO-NOMA networks under the total power constraints
with reasonable time consumption. Due to the complexity of
the problem, we decompose it into two wiretap channel sub-
problems. Then, we design the transmit covariance matrix for
each problem and show that the performance loss is negligible.
The contributions of this letter are summarized as follows:
• By splitting the total power between the two users, we
decompose the two-user secure MIMO-NOMA channel
into two MIMO wiretap channels with respective power
constraints.
• We propose new precoding and power allocation to solve
the new problems, and introduce an efficient and cost-
effective algorithm for secure transmission in MIMO-
NOMA networks within practical ranges of antennas.
Our approach strikes a balance between performance and
time consumption.
Notations: tr(·) and (·)T denote the trace and transpose
of matrices. E(·) denotes expectation. diag(λ1, . . . , λn) rep-
resents diagonal matrix with diagonal elements λ1, . . . , λn.
Q < 0 means Q is a positive semidefinite matrix, and I is an
identity matrix.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a two-user MIMO-NOMA network, as shown
in Fig. 1. The transmitter (Tx), user 1, and user 2 are equipped
with nt, n1, and n2 antennas, respectively. The Tx serves the
users with two confidential messages W1 and W2 (such as
accessing bank accounts and performing online transactions),
i.e., user i should not be able to decode Wi when i 6= j, i, j ∈
{1, 2}. In this setting, user 1 can be seen as an eavesdropper to
user 2 and vice versa. Due to NOMA transmission, the input
vectors x1 ∈ R
nt×1 and x2 ∈ R
nt×1 intended for user 1 and
2user 2 share the same time and frequency slot. The received
signals at user 1 and user 2, respectively, are given by
y1 = H1(x1 + x2) +w1, (1a)
y2 = H2(x1 + x2) +w2, (1b)
in which H1 ∈ R
n1×nt and H2 ∈ R
n2×nt are the channel
matrices for user 1 and user 2, and w1 ∈ R
n1×1 and w2 ∈
R
n2×1 are independent identically distributed (i.i.d) Gaussian
noise vectors whose elements are zero mean and unit variance.
This setting is also known as MIMO broadcast channel (BC)
with two confidential messages, and its secrecy capacity region
under the average total power constraint can be expressed as
[9], [13]
R1 ≤
1
2
log |I+H1Q1H
T
1 | −
1
2
log |I+H2Q1H
T
2 |, (2a)
R2 ≤
1
2
log
∣∣∣∣I+ H2Q2H
T
2
I+H2Q1HT2
∣∣∣∣− 12 log
∣∣∣∣I+ H1Q2H
T
1
I+H1Q1HT1
∣∣∣∣
(2b)
s.t. tr(Q1 +Q2) ≤ P, Q1 < 0, Q2 < 0 (2c)
in which Q1 = E(x1x
T
1 ) and Q2 = E(x2x
T
2 ) are the input
covariance matrices corresponding to x1 and x2, respectively.
The capacity region in (2) is obtained via S-DPC. However,
S-DPC is prohibitively complex for practical uses. Typically,
an exhaustive search over all possible Q1 and Q2 satisfying
the constraints in (2c) [9] is used to get the capacity region.
In [11], a GSVD-base precoder is proposed for this channel.
Although its complexity is low, the rate region of GSVD-based
precoding is far from the capacity region.
In this letter, we show that the above secure MIMO-
NOMA channel can be seen as two interwoven MIMO wiretap
channels. In one wiretap channel, user 1 is viewed as a
legitimate user, while user 2 is an eavesdropper. The secrecy
rate of this channel is obtained from (2a). In the second
wiretap channel, the role of user 1 and user 2 is swapped,
and the secrecy rate of this channel is obtained from (2b).
Due to the symmetry of the channel, the rate region in (2) can
be equivalently obtained by swapping the subscripts 1 and
2 in (2a) and (2b) [13, Corollary 1]. Next, we design novel
precoding and power allocation schemes that achieve capacity
region with reasonable complexity.
III. DECOMPOSING SECURE MIMO-NOMA INTO TWO
MIMO WIRETAP CHANNELS
In order to introduce new simpler solutions, in this sec-
tion, we decompose the aforementioned secure MIMO-NOMA
channel into two MIMO wiretap channels. This is done in
three steps. First, similar to the BC channel, we split the power
between the two users. Then, we decouple the secure MIMO-
NOMA channel into two MIMO wiretap channels to solve
them separately, as described below.
Step 1: Introducing power splitting factor α ∈ [0, 1], we
dedicate a fraction α of the total power to user 1 (P1 = αP ),
and fraction α¯, α¯ = 1− α, to user 2 (P2 = α¯P ).
Step 2: We design secure precoding for user 1 while treating
user 2 as an eavesdropper. Because (2a) is only controlled by
the covariance matrixQ1, the problem can be seen as a wiretap
channel under a transmit power P1, which is
R1(α) = max
Q10
1
2
log
|I+H1Q1H
T
1 |
|I+H2Q1HT2 |
, (3a)
s.t. tr(Q1) ≤ P1 = αP. (3b)
This problem is now the well-known MIMO wiretap channel
[14], and standard MIMO wiretap solutions can be applied.
Step 3: We design secure precoding for user 2 to maximize
the rate of user 2 by allocating the remaining power, and using
Q∗1 obtained in Step 2 to (2b). Thus, (2b) is represented as
R2(α) = max
Q20
{
1
2
log
∣∣∣∣I+ H2Q2H
T
2
I+H2Q∗1H
T
2
∣∣∣∣
−
1
2
log
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T
1
I+H1Q∗1H
T
1
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}
, (4a)
s.t. tr(Q2) ≤ P2 = (1 − α)P. (4b)
Since Q∗1 is given after solving (3), in the following we show
that the above problem can be seen as another wiretap channel
where users 2 and 1 are the legitimate user and eavesdropper,
respectively.
Theorem 1. The above channel can be converted to a stan-
dard MIMO wiretap channel with
H′1 , Λ
− 1
2
a V
T
aH1, (5a)
H′2 , Λ
− 1
2
b V
T
b H2, (5b)
in which Λa and Va are the eigenvalues and eigenvectors
of I + H1Q
∗
1H
T
1 , and Λb and Vb are the eigenvalues and
eigenvectors of I+H2Q
∗
1H
T
2 .
Proof. Let us define
Σ1 , I+H1Q
∗
1H
T
1 = VaΛaV
T
a , (6a)
Σ2 , I+H2Q
∗
1H
T
2 = VbΛbV
T
b , (6b)
Then, the rate for user 2 can be written as
R2(α) = max
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, (7)
in which (a) holds because det(I+AB) = det(I+BA) and
Λa and Λb are diagonal matrices.
In view of (7), it is seen that like (3a), (4a) is the rate for
a MIMO wiretap channel with channels H′2 for the legitimate
user and H′1 for the eavesdropper.
3IV. SECURE PRECODING AND POWER ALLOCATION
In this section, we propose new linear precoding and power
allocation strategies to secure the MIMO-NOMA channel. In
light of our decomposition in the previous section, we have
two MIMO wiretap channels and thus standard MIMO wiretap
solutions can be applied to design covariance matrices Q1 and
Q2. One fast approach is rotation based linear precoding [14].
In this method, the covariance matrix Q1 is eigendecomposed
into one rotation matrix V1 and one power allocation matrix
Λ1 [14], [15] as
Q1 = V1Λ1V
T
1 . (8)
Consequently, the secrecy capacity of user 1 is
R1(α) = max
Q10
1
2
log
|I+H1V1Λ1V
T
1H
T
1 |
|I+H2V1Λ1VT1H
T
2 |
, (9a)
s.t.
nt∑
k=1
λ1k ≤ P1 = αP, (9b)
in which λ1k, k = {1, . . . , nt}, is a diagonal element of matrix
Λ1 = diag(λ11, . . . , λ1nt). The rotation matrix V1 can be
obtained by
V1 =
nt−1∏
i=1
nt∏
j=i+1
Vij , (10)
in which the basic rotation matrix Vij is a Givens matrix [16]
which is an identity matrix except that its elements in the ith
row and jth column, i.e., vii, vij , vji, and vjj are replaced by[
vii vij
vji vjj
]
=
[
cos θ1ij − sin θ1ij
sin θ1ij cos θ1ij
]
, (11)
where θ1ij is rotation angle corresponding to the rotation
matrix Vij . Then, we will optimize the new parameterized
nonconvex problem numerically to obtain the solutionQ∗1 with
respect to rotation angles and power allocation parameters.
Similarly, covariance matrix Q2 can be written by rotation
method as Q2 = V2Λ2V
T
2 , where the rotation matrix V2 is
defined similar to V1 in (10) with its rotation angles are θ2ij .
Therefore, the optimization problem for R2(α) becomes
R2(α) = max
Q20
1
2
log
|I+H′1V2Λ2V
T
2H
′T
1 |
|I+H′2V2Λ2V
T
2H
′T
2 |
, (12a)
s.t.
nt∑
k=1
λ2k ≤ P2 = (1− α)P, (12b)
in which λ2k is the kth diagonal element of Λ2. This problem
is again similar to (9).
To solve the new parameterized problems in (9) and (12) to
find new parameters λ1k, θ1ij and λ2k, θ2ij (instead of directly
finding Q1 and Q2 in (2)), various numerical approaches such
as Matlab fmincon can be used. In this paper, for a fixed
α ∈ [0, 1], we use Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS)
method together with the interior-point method (IPM) [17].
IPM transfers the constraints into an unconstrained problem,
and BFGS is a quasi-Newton iterative method for nonlinear
optimization. The algorithm is elaborated in Algorithm 1.
In the power splitting method, we introduced in Section III,
and new optimization problems in (9) and (12), for each α,
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Fig. 2: The effect of the order of precoding on the secure rate
region for different values of transmit power (P ).
Algorithm 1 Rotation Based Precoding and Power Allocation
1: inputs: P , nt, n1, n2, σ;
2: for α from 0 to 1 with a step σ do
3: case 1:
4: P1 = αP ;
5: solve for λ1k and θ1ij , in (9) using BFGS and IPM;
6: generate Q∗1 by (8) and (10)–(11);
7: calculate R∗1(α) by inserting Q
∗
1 in (9a);
8: P2 = (1− α)P ;
9: calculate H′1 and H
′
2 via (5);
10: solve for λ2k and θ2ij in (12) using BFGS and IPM;
11: calculate R∗2(α) by inserting Q
∗
2 in (12a);
12: obtain (R∗1(α), R
∗
2(α));
13: case 2:
14: swap all subscripts of 1 and 2 in (2) and case 1;
15: repeat case 1 and obtain (R¯∗1(α), R¯
∗
2(α));
16: end for
17: Obtain the secrecy region Rs via Lemma 1.
we solve for Q∗1 and Q
∗
2 (and thus R
∗
1(α) and R
∗
2(α)) step by
step. This simplifies the problem but may result in sub-optimal
rate region. Moreover, the order of optimization (first R∗1 then
R∗2) will affect the solution.
Alternatively, we can first solve forQ∗2 followed byQ
∗
1 (i.e.,
first R∗2 then R
∗
1). We represent this solution (R¯
∗
1(α), R¯
∗
2(α))
in Algorithm 1. In general, changing the order of optimization
will result in a different rate region. To show how the order of
precoding can change the achievable rate region, we demon-
strate an example in Fig. 2 with different powers P = 2, 4, 8,
where the channels are
H1 =
[
0.125 0.821 0.087
0.383 0.261 0.037
]
,
H2 =
[
0.384 0.703 0.849
]
.
Thus, the convex hull of the two solutions with different orders
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Fig. 3: Secrecy rate regions for
nt = n1 = n2 = 2 with different powers.
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may enlarge the achievable rate region.
Lemma 1. The achievable secrecy region Rs for the secure
MIMO-NOMA channel under total power constraint is the
convex hull of all rate points
Rs =
⋃
0≤α≤1
{
(R∗1(α), R
∗
2(α)) ∪ (R¯
∗
1(α), R¯
∗
2(α))
}
, (13)
where (R∗1(α), R
∗
2(α)) is obtained by precoding for user 1
then user 2, whereas (R¯∗1(α), R¯
∗
2(α)) is obtained by precoding
in the reverse order (first user 2, then user 1).
Remark 1 (Complexity Analysis): The BFGS algorithm
yields the complexity of O(n2) [17], where n is the size of
input variables which in our case is the number of rotation
parameters, i.e., n = (nt+1)nt2 . On the other hand, the
computation of matrix multiplications and matrix inverse yield
the complexity of O(L3) where L = max(nt, n1, n2). Thus,
the overall complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(
n4
t
+L3
σ
) and σ is
the search step of the power fraction α. The weighted sum-rate
has the complexity of O(L
3
ǫσ
log(1/ǫ)) with a search over the
weight [12], and ǫ is the convergence tolerance of algorithm.
The GSVD-based precoding [11] has O(L
3
σ
+ L
σ
log(1/ǫ)), in
which the search step σ over power comes from [11, Corollary
1]. The computational complexity of the exhaustive search for
S-DPC is exponential in L [9].
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we compare the rate region (R1, R2) of the
proposed method with the secrecy capacity region obtained by
S-DPC [9], weighted secrecy sum-rate maximization using the
block successive lower-bound maximization (BSLM) [12], and
GSVD-based precoding [11]. The capacity region is obtained
by an exhaustive search over all input covariance matrices
whereas BSLM maximization is achieved by an iterative
algorithm, which successively optimizes a sequence of approx-
imated functions using binary search [12] to reach higher rates.
GSVD-based precoding is an orthogonal channel assignment,
and orthogonal multiple access (OMA) is achieved by the
time-sharing between the two extreme points (two wiretap
channels) which realizes the same task in two orthogonal time
slots controlled by the time-sharing fraction.
The channel matrices H1 and H2 are generated randomly
H1 =
[
0.783 0.590
0.734 0.092
]
, H2 =
[
0.244 0.617
0.947 0.807
]
,
for P = 1, 10, 100. The search step ǫ for Algorithm 1 and
GSVD-based precoding [11] is set as 0.05 identically. As
Fig. 3 illustrates, the proposed algorithm achieves larger rate
regions compared to GSVD-based precoding [11], and almost
identical to the capacity and BSLM maximization [12]. In
the MISO case of H1 = [1.5 0] and H1 = [1.801 0.871], and
P = 10, 100, and 1000, we found that our proposed algorithm
can reach the same secrecy region and obtained exactly the
same figure in [12, Fig. 2].
Fig. 4 shows secrecy rate regions for nt = 3 with P =
2, 4, 8, and σ = 0.05, where the channels are
H1 =
[
0.813 0.232 0.085
0.842 0.130 0.203
]
,
H2 =
[
0.315 0.769 0.294
0.025 0.271 0.281
]
.
Again, the proposed method largely outperforms GSVD-
based precoding, and achieve the same rate region compared
with the BSLM method.
Although both BSLM and the proposed method are very
close to the secrecy capacity, the computation costs of the
two methods are remarkably different, particularly for practical
numbers of antennas. Table. I, Table. II, and Fig. 5 show
the execution time for all three precoding methods over 100
random channel realizations. BSLM takes much higher time
to reach the same rate region as our proposed method in
Algorithm 1, as BSLM is achieved by an iterative algorithm.
Our proposed method can save time ten to a hundred times
especially for portable devices equipped with a few antennas
and can strike a balance between performance and computa-
tion complexity.
For massive MIMO-NOMA, the number of optimization
parameters in Algorithm 1 become considerable as nt becomes
very large. The solution proposed in this letter is not meant for
such scenarios. One can, however, reduce the complexity for
5TABLE I: Execution time (ms) for nt = 2 and P = 30.
BSLM [12]
n2
1 2 3 4 5
n1
1 2063.0 3428.2 3774.0 4904 4516.6
2 3735.1 6524.8 7411.6 8630.8 9400.4
3 4814.3 7158.5 9675.9 10310.4 10411.4
4 5426.1 9380.0 11285.4 13446.8 13086.3
5 6776.4 10931.0 13572.1 15300.5 16959.1
Algorithm 1
n2
1 2 3 4 5
n1
1 113.7 112.2 101.8 102.3 95.3
2 108.2 105.5 99.9 98.1 93.5
3 95.0 100.2 101.9 99.0 96.0
4 94.6 98.9 106.6 99.1 101.2
5 94.2 92.9 98.4 96.8 95.6
GSVD [11]
n2
1 2 3 4 5
n1
1 16.9 17.0 16.5 17.0 16.6
2 16.8 17.0 17.3 16.9 17.1
3 16.6 17.3 17.2 17.6 17.8
4 16.8 17.2 18.6 17.8 19.1
5 18.1 17.3 17.6 18.0 17.7
TABLE II: Execution time (ms) for nt = 3 and P = 30.
BSLM [12]
n2
1 2 3 4 5
n1
1 2364.8 3029.8 4218.9 4893.1 4776.5
2 3386.5 4612.6 6138.8 7504.0 9829.3
3 5304.3 8190.1 10169.9 11428.9 12051.0
4 5432.4 7982.4 10363.0 13440.3 13744.5
5 6708.0 8450.5 11337.1 13851.8 15552.5
Algorithm 1
n2
1 2 3 4 5
n1
1 215.5 503.2 476.0 448.6 409.1
2 493.2 399.9 375.7 379.9 371.8
3 478.8 381.7 354.0 392.6 396.0
4 428.5 364.0 379.8 407.9 388.1
5 460.7 391.3 377.8 370.6 371.9
GSVD [11]
n2
1 2 3 4 5
n1
1 17.1 19.6 17.8 18.1 18.6
2 19.5 18.9 18.2 19.4 19.6
3 18.2 18.0 18.4 22.0 21.6
4 18.7 19.4 21.1 23.4 22.6
5 23.2 22.2 21.2 22.5 23.3
large values of nt by applying other wiretap solutions such as
alternating optimization [18]. On the other hand, other massive
MIMO solutions, such as [8], [19], [20] may be more effective.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
A novel linear precoding has been proposed for secure trans-
mission over MIMO-NOMA networks to prevent users from
eavesdropping each other. The proposed approach decomposes
the two-user MIMO-NOMA channel into two MIMO wiretap
channels via splitting the base station power between the two
users and modifying the channel corresponding to one of the
users to make it a wiretap channel in effect. This approach
achieves a significantly higher secure rate region compared to
existing linear precoding, and has an acceptable computational
complexity.
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